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HEALTH, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, AND THE
MASSACHUSETTS SUPREME JUDICIAL
COURT AS CRITICAL SOCIAL MOVEMENT
ALLY
Carlo A. Pedrioli*
“[I]t is circular reasoning, not analysis, to maintain that
marriage must remain a heterosexual institution because that is what it
historically has been.”1
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1. Goodridge v. Dep’t. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 962 n.23 (Mass. 2003).
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I. INTRODUCTION
On November 18, 2003, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court, “the oldest appellate court in continuous existence in the
Western Hemisphere,” charged with interpreting “the oldest, still
functioning written constitution in the world,”2 announced its decision
in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health.3 Goodridge was the
first state supreme court opinion to strike down restrictions on samesex marriage in the United States.4 In asserting the right of sexual
minorities to civil marriage, the Supreme Judicial Court gave the
Massachusetts Legislature 180 days to bring the law into conformity
with the Court’s reading of the Massachusetts Constitution.5 In
Opinions of the Justices to the Senate,6 an advisory opinion issued to
the Massachusetts Senate on February 3, 2004, the Court insisted that
sexual minorities must have access to marriage; civil unions would not
suffice.7 On May 17, 2004, Massachusetts became the first state in the
United States to make marriage available for same-sex couples, and
many such couples took advantage of the new opportunity.8
The decision in Goodridge came in response to the modern social
movement for same-sex marriage, which had begun in the 1990s with
litigation that several same-sex couples had brought in Hawaii.9
Shortly after the Hawaii litigation, organizations like Lambda Legal
and the Equality Federation, a nationwide umbrella group of sexual

2. About the Supreme Judicial Court, MASS.GOV, https://www.mass.gov/servicedetails/about-the-supreme-judicial-court (last visited Apr. 9, 2021). The Massachusetts
Constitution dates back to 1780. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 988 n.7 (Cordy, J., dissenting).
3. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
4. Anthony Brooks, Mass. High Court Strikes Down Gay Marriage Ban: Judges Find Law
Barring Same-Sex Unions Unconstitutional, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Nov. 18, 2003, 12:00 AM),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=1511038.
5. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 969–70.
6. 802 N.E.2d 565 (Mass. 2004).
7. Id. at 570. Commentary noted that such a dual system that allowed heterosexual couples
to have access to marriage but restricted same-sex couples to civil unions not only privileged
marriage, but the system also “reproduce[d] exclusions.” Jeffrey A. Bennett, Seriality and
Multicultural Dissent in the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 3 COMMC’N & CRITICAL/CULTURAL
STUD. 141, 149 (2006).
8. State-Sanctioned Gay Marriages Begin in Massachusetts, PBS NEWSHOUR (May 17,
2004, 11:17 AM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/law-jan-june04-gaymarriage_05-17;
How It Happened: 10 Years of Gay Marriage, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (May 17, 2014, 5:07 PM),
http://www.npr.org/2014/05/17/313457795/how-it-happened-10-years-of-gay-marriage.
9. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (plurality opinion), superseded by
constitutional amendment, HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23, abrogated by Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S.
644 (2015).
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minority rights groups, made same-sex marriage a priority.10 The
Plaintiffs in Goodridge and their legal counsel were part of this
movement. Preferring to promote other matters like antidiscrimination law outside of the area of marriage, not all members of
the larger social movement for sexual minority rights supported the
push for same-sex marriage.11 One major concern was the potential
for backlash,12 which had followed the litigation in Hawaii.13
Goodridge was controversial, and the backlash was swift and
intense. Emails to the Supreme Judicial Court, including those from
other states, arrived, and many authors called the justices “every name
imaginable.”14 A group hired planes to fly above the justices’
neighborhoods with banners critical of the members of the Court.15
The justices received death threats, and, after giving a speech on King
Day in 2004, one justice was picked up by an armed guard.16
President George W. Bush and his advisors took advantage of the
opportunity that Goodridge presented. In the 2004 State of the Union
Address, delivered on January 20, only two months after the Court’s
decision, Bush gave the following warning to a national audience:
Activist judges . . . have begun redefining marriage by court
order, without regard for the will of the people and their
elected representatives. On an issue of such great
consequence, the people’s voice must be heard. If judges
insist on forcing their arbitrary will upon the people, the only
alternative left to the people would be the constitutional
process. Our nation must defend the sanctity of marriage.17

10. MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM THE CLOSET TO THE
THE STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 176 (2013).

ALTAR: COURTS, BACKLASH, AND

11. See id. at 176–77.
12. See id.
13. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL
CHANGE? 417 (2d ed. 2008).
14. Roderick L. Ireland, In Goodridge’s Wake: Reflections on the Political, Public, and
Personal Repercussions of the Massachusetts Same-Sex Marriage Cases, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1417,
1421 (2010).
15. Id. at 1421–22.
16. Id. at 1421, 1431.
17. George W. Bush, Third Presidential State of the Union Address (Jan. 20, 2004),
http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/stateoftheunion2004.htm.
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By the summer of 2004, the Bush reelection campaign anticipated that
same-sex marriage might be the issue that would get Bush reelected
that November.18
At both the federal and state levels, constitutional amendments to
ban same-sex marriage were in play. In 2004 and 2006, lawmakers in
Congress, with the help of President Bush, attempted to pass a federal
constitutional amendment to ban same-sex marriage, but the measure
failed to gain two-thirds majorities in both federal houses.19 In 2004,
thirteen states amended their constitutions to ban same-sex marriage.20
Before 2004, only three states had such bans.21 Between 2005 and
2012, fifteen more states banned same-sex marriage.22 In
Massachusetts, an attempt to overturn Goodridge via a state
constitutional amendment moved forward in March 2004, although
that particular attempt ultimately failed in September 2005.23
Overstating the importance of Goodridge would be difficult.
Although the Vermont Supreme Court had stated in 1999 that sexual
minorities were entitled to the benefits of marriage, the Vermont
Supreme Court had allowed the Vermont Legislature to give sexual
minorities the right to civil unions instead of marriage.24 The
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court went beyond civil unions. In
the years that followed Goodridge, other state supreme courts
followed the position taken by the Supreme Judicial Court, and
eventually legislatures and voters in numerous other states took action
that led to the right to same-sex marriage.25 As difficult as it would

18. Michael J. Klarman, Brown and Lawrence (and Goodridge), 104 MICH. L. REV. 431, 464
(2005).
19. David Masci & Ira C. Lupu, Overview of Same-Sex Marriage in the United States, PEW
RSCH. CTR. (Dec. 7, 2012), http://www.pewforum.org/2012/12/07/overview-of-same-sexmarriage-in-the-united-states/.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Rick Klein, Vote Ties Civil Unions to Gay-Marriage Ban: Romney to Seek Stay of SJC
Order, BOS. GLOBE (Mar. 30, 2004), http://www.boston.com/news/specials/gay_marriage/articles
/2004/03/30/vote_ties_civil_unions_to_gay_marriage_ban/; Pam Belluck, Massachusetts Rejects
Bill to Eliminate Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 15, 2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/
15/us/massachusetts-rejects-bill-to-eliminate-gay-marriage.html.
24. Masci & Lupu, supra note 19; see Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
25. See Erica Ryan, Timeline: Gay Marriage in Law, Pop Culture and the Courts, NAT’L PUB.
RADIO (June 26, 2013, 5:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/2013/03/21/174732431/timeline-gaymarriage-in-law-pop-culture-and-the-courts.
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have been to predict only a few years after Goodridge,26 a decade after
the decision, same-sex marriage was becoming much more available
across the United States,27 and a dozen years after the decision, in
Obergefell v. Hodges,28 the U.S. Supreme Court struck down, on
federal constitutional grounds, several state statutes that prohibited
same-sex marriage, which effectively legalized same-sex marriage
across the United States.29
Although courts do interface with social movements, courts do
not often contribute to leading the way for change. For example, when
the U.S. Supreme Court issued the Brown v. Board of Education30
public school desegregation decision, some states already had begun
to desegregate their schools, so the Supreme Court was following the
legislatures, the representatives of the people, in those states.31 When,
in United States v. Windsor,32 the U.S. Supreme Court struck down
the heterosexual-only federal definition of marriage in the Defense of
Marriage Act of 1996 (DOMA),33 same-sex marriage was already
legal in twelve states,34 and the national public opinion was slightly in
favor of same-sex marriage.35 Again, the Supreme Court followed.
To the contrary, in Goodridge, the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court, not a legislative body representative of the public,
played a leading role in mandating a change in the social order before
the culture, or at least significant portions of it, would accept such

26. Peter Dickinson, Love Is a Battlefield: The Performance and Politics of Same-Sex
Marriage in North America, 28 TEXT & PERFORMANCE Q. 277, 294 (2008).
27. Same-Sex Marriage, State by State, PEW RSCH. CTR. (June 26, 2015),
http://www.pewforum.org/2015/06/26/same-sex-marriage-state-by-state/.
28. 576 U.S. 644 (2015).
29. Id. at 675.
30. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
31. MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 344–45 (2004). The South refused to desegregate its
schools for many years. A decade after Brown, in the eleven states in the old Confederacy, only
1.17% of Black students attended school with White students. DERRICK BELL, SILENT
COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL
REFORM 96 (2004).
32. 570 U.S. 744 (2013).
33. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996), invalidated by United
States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013) (striking down Section 3, which contained the heterosexualonly federal definition of marriage) and Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) (superseding
Section 2, which allowed sibling states not to recognize same-sex marriages from other states).
34. Windsor, 570 U.S. at 765.
35. Jeffrey M. Jones, Same-Sex Marriage Support Solidifies Above 50% in U.S., GALLUP
(May 13, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/162398/sex-marriage-support-solidifies-above.aspx.
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change.36 Prior to Goodridge, no state had legalized same-sex
marriage, and, at the time of the decision, only 33% of people in the
United States supported same-sex marriage, while 58% opposed it.37
Although, according to one poll, 50% of Massachusetts residents
supported same-sex marriage in the months prior to Goodridge, 44%
of state residents opposed same-sex marriage at that time.38 Moreover,
Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney and many members of the
Massachusetts Legislature opposed same-sex marriage, and, in the
wake of the decision, the Legislature was seriously contemplating
avoiding same-sex marriage by offering civil unions for same-sex
couples.39 Governor Romney supported a state constitutional
amendment to ban same-sex marriage.40 Given these dynamics,
Goodridge provides an intriguing set of texts for study.
Without attempting to discount the role of activists who led the
modern movement for same-sex marriage, this Article draws upon
social movement theory in the field of communication to examine how
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court played a leading role from
within the establishment in furthering the social movement for samesex marriage in the United States. The Article looks at the various
opinions in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, as well as
those in Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, the Court’s responses
to the Massachusetts Senate’s request for an advisory opinion on
providing civil unions but not marriage to sexual minorities, to see
how the members of the Court, closely divided four votes to three in
both sets of opinions, constructed or refrained from constructing
marriage as a right that should be available to sexual minorities. The
Article proceeds by offering a brief note on social movement theory
in communication; examining the various opinions in Goodridge,
including the controlling opinion, a concurring opinion, and three
dissenting opinions; and reviewing the ensuing advisory opinions,
including the majority opinion and the two dissenting opinions. This
discussion should contribute toward a greater understanding of state
36. Klarman, supra note 18, at 477.
37. David Masci, High Court to Hear Same-Sex Marriage Cases, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Mar. 20,
2013), http://www.pewforum.org/2013/03/20/high-court-to-hear-same-sex-marriage-cases/.
38. Frank Phillips & Rick Klein, 50% in Poll Back SJC Ruling on Gay Marriage, BOS. GLOBE
(Nov. 23, 2003), http://www.boston.com/news/local/articles/2003/11/23/50_in_poll_back_sjc_rul
ing_on_gay_marriage/.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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supreme court rhetoric of social change and also offer some
refinement of social movement theory, particularly regarding how a
faction within a fractured establishment can further a social
movement.
II. A BRIEF NOTE ON SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY IN
COMMUNICATION
In the field of communication, consideration of social movements
became particularly intense during and shortly after the mid-1960s.41
Between 1965 and 1980, communication scholars published over 200
studies of various aspects of social movements.42 Such study is
understandable given the great amount of social angst and the ensuing
unrest that the 1960s produced. Of course, other fields such as political
science and sociology have devoted great attention to social
movements as well,43 but the focus here will be on social movement
theory in communication.
Social movements are “group action undertaken by social actors,
including individuals, groups and organizations, for the purpose of
affecting social and political change.”44 From the perspective of
traditional social movement theory in communication, social
movements have unfolded in a particular manner. Initially,
individuals, who are generally relatively large in number,45 are
concerned with some aspect of society and seek change.46 Different
types of media are important in furthering the message of a social
movement,47 and leadership provides the face of the movement that
41. See Stephen E. Lucas, Coming to Terms with Movement Studies, 31 CENT. STATES SPEECH
J. 255, 255 (1980).
42. Id.
43. Christina R. Foust & Kate Drazner Hoyt, Social Movement 2.0: Integrating and Assessing
Scholarship on Social Media and Movement, 18 REV. COMMC’N 37, 38 (2018).
44. Halim Rane & Sumra Salem, Social Media, Social Movements and the Diffusion of Ideas
in the Arab Uprisings, 18 J. INT’L COMMC’N 97, 98 (2012).
45. Lucas, supra note 41, at 255.
46. Leland M. Griffin, The Rhetoric of Historical Movements, 38 Q.J. SPEECH 184, 184
(1952).
47. Karma R. Chávez, Counter-Public Enclaves and Understanding the Function of Rhetoric
in Social Movement Coalition-Building, 59 COMMC’N Q. 1, 6 (2011). Social movements can use
media to convey logical and emotional discourses, verbal and nonverbal discourses, and some
combination of these types of discourse. See KEVIN MICHAEL DELUCA, IMAGE POLITICS: THE
NEW RHETORIC OF ENVIRONMENTAL ACTIVISM 14–22 (1999). See generally Franklyn S. Haiman,
Nonverbal Communication and the First Amendment: The Rhetoric of the Streets Revisited, 68 Q.J.
SPEECH 371, 371 (1982) (discussing developments in nonverbal modes of protest). Although media
concentration can be a challenge for a social movement that is trying to promote its message, more
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the public recognizes.48 The social movement agitates against the
establishment, generally making the movement’s presence known,
and the establishment responds to movement activity, often in an
attempt to control the social movement.49 Social movements can
constitute both phenomena and meaning.50
One important aspect of traditional social movement theory has
been that social movements are not institutionalized.51 From this
perspective, a social movement organization is not part of the
establishment,52 and the organization often tries to form its identity in
such a manner as to separate itself from the establishment.53 Indeed,
the line between the social movement and the establishment is clear.
Established institutions that change themselves do not constitute social
movements, and when a social movement becomes part of the status
quo, the social movement is no longer a social movement.54
A classic example of a social movement is the civil rights
movement of the 1950s and 1960s.55 At that time, many AfricanAmericans responded to racially discriminatory laws and practices,

recent technologies can help a movement get around media concentration. See DELUCA, supra, at
47. See generally Elise Danielle Thorburn, Social Media, Subjectivity, and Surveillance: Moving
on from Occupy, the Rise of Live Streaming Video, 11 COMMC’N & CRITICAL/CULTURAL STUD.
52, 52 (2014) (discussing the use of live streaming in the 2012 Quebec student strike).
48. CHARLES J. STEWART, CRAIG ALLEN SMITH & ROBERT E. DENTON, JR., PERSUASION
AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 111–12 (4th ed. 2001). Study of social movements has focused on public
rhetorical actions such as the “oratorical, material, visual, or performative and embodied.” Chávez,
supra note 47, at 2.
49. JOHN W. BOWERS, DONOVAN J. OCHS & RICHARD J. JENSEN, THE RHETORIC OF
AGITATION AND CONTROL 4, 8 (2d ed. 1993); Erika Biddle, Re-Animating Joseph Beuys’ “Social
Sculpture”: Artistic Interventions and the Occupy Movement, 11 COMMC’N &
CRITICAL/CULTURAL STUD. 25, 29–30 (2014). Although traditional thinking has been that physical
presence is important in social movements, more recent thinking has considered the possibility that
physical absence may be important in some social movements. See id. at 29–30 (considering the
Occupy movement of fall 2011).
50. Lucas, supra note 41, at 258. For an argument that social movements constitute meaning
as opposed to phenomena, see Michael Calvin McGee, “Social Movement”: Phenomenon or
Meaning?, 31 CENT. STATES SPEECH J. 233, 233 (1980). McGee argued that, for the rhetorical
study of movements to become its own domain, such study should be hermeneutic as opposed to
simply behavioral in nature. Id. at 241–42.
51. Lucas, supra note 41, at 255–56; STEWART, SMITH & DENTON, supra note 48, at 5–6.
52. STEWART, SMITH & DENTON, supra note 48, at 5.
53. Jennifer Ann Peeples, Downwind: Articulation and Appropriation of Social Movement
Discourse, 76 S. COMMC’N J. 248, 251 (2011).
54. STEWART, SMITH & DENTON, supra note 48, at 5–6.
55. See Franklyn S. Haiman, The Rhetoric of the Streets: Some Legal and Ethical
Considerations, 53 Q.J. SPEECH 99, 99–100 (1967).
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such as those related to public accommodations and voting.56 The civil
rights movement found support in and inspiration from the Black
church.57 Martin Luther King, Jr., himself a pastor, was a principal
face of the movement.58 Leaders like King spoke out publicly, while
they and their followers drew attention to their cause in the streets and
elsewhere.59 These developments received much-needed media
coverage, particularly on television.60 Meanwhile, Southern
politicians tried, both rhetorically and physically, to resist the
movement.61
Other examples of social movements include the movements for
women’s rights,62 against the Vietnam War,63 for Latino/a rights,64
against neoliberalism,65 and to address the climate crisis.66 Some
social movements have developed specific names. The Me Too,
Occupy, and Black Lives Matter movements, which respectively have
demanded change regarding sexual harassment and assault of
women,67 socioeconomic inequality,68 and police violence against
Black people,69 are three examples of such movements. Movements
are not necessarily mutually exclusive of each other.
The traditional perspective on social movements described above
assumes a homogenous establishment that responds monolithically to
the agitation of a movement. However, the establishment is not always
56. Id. at 99–100, 112; Jack Nelson, The Civil Rights Movement: A Press Perspective, 28
HUM. RTS. 3, 4 (2001).
57. Dennis C. Dickerson, African American Religious Intellectuals and the Theological
Foundations of the Civil Rights Movement, 1930–55, 74 CHURCH HIST. 217, 217–20 (2005).
58. Id. at 217.
59. Id.; Haiman, supra note 55, at 99–100, 112.
60. Nelson, supra note 56, at 4.
61. Dan T. Carter, Legacy of Rage: George Wallace and the Transformation of American
Politics, 62 J. S. HIST. 3, 6–7 (1996); Nelson, supra note 56, at 4.
62. Chávez, supra note 47, at 2.
63. See Haiman, supra note 55, at 99.
64. See Fernando Pedro Delgado, Chicano Movement Rhetoric: An Ideographic
Interpretation, 43 COMMC’N Q. 446, 446 (1995).
65. See Shiv Ganesh & Cynthia Stohl, Qualifying Engagement: A Study of Information and
Communication Technology and the Global Social Justice Movement in Aotearoa New Zealand,
77 COMMC’N MONOGRAPHS 51, 51–52 (2010).
66. Nicholas S. Paliewicz, Making Sense of the People’s Climate March: Towards an
Aesthetic Approach to the Rhetoric of Social Protest, 83 W.J. COMMC’N 94, 94–95 (2019).
67. See
Emma
Frances
Bloomfield,
Rhetorical
Constellations
and
the
Inventional/Intersectional Possibilities of #MeToo, 43 J. COMMC’N INQUIRY 394, 400–01 (2019).
68. See Biddle, supra note 49, at 26–27.
69. See Chloe Banks, Disciplining Black Activism: Post-Racial Rhetoric, Public Memory and
Decorum in News Media Framing of the Black Lives Matter Movement, 32 CONTINUUM: J. MEDIA
& CULTURAL STUD. 709, 710 (2018).

(9) 54.2_PEDRIOLI.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

4/23/21 9:51 AM

2021] GOODRIDGE AND MASS. SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT

525

homogenous and actually may be fractured in responding to
agitation.70 Indeed, engagement may take place within the
establishment.71 After the movement’s initial agitation, engagement
can occur between or among the factions within the power structure.72
For instance, if a faction within the court system is receptive to a
movement’s message, the court system can be a point of entry into the
system for agitators.73 Presumably, if an internal faction is large or
influential enough, the original agitators can do more than have their
message heard, and significant social change is possible.
When, via a faction within the establishment, a social movement
gains significant access to a limited part, but not all parts, of the
establishment, the line between the social movement and the
establishment becomes blurred. While the social movement may still
exist outside the establishment, and factions of the establishment may
attempt to control the social movement in response to the movement’s
agitation, a portion of the establishment nonetheless labors on behalf
of the social movement. That pro-social movement faction of the
establishment is neither the social movement itself nor the
establishment that attempts to control the social movement. Thus, the
pro-social movement faction of the establishment functions in a
liminal rhetorical space that is theoretically provocative and
suggestive of a need for some revision of traditional social movement
theory in communication. This complicating dynamic of a strong prosocial movement faction of the establishment developed in the
Goodridge case, and the consequences were profound.
III. THE GOODRIDGE OPINIONS AS RESPONSES TO AGITATION
AGAINST A FRACTURED ESTABLISHMENT
Although litigation over same-sex marriage in the United States
dates back to the 1970s,74 same-sex couples who sought access to

70. Carlo A. Pedrioli, A Fractured Establishment’s Responses to Social Movement Agitation:
The U.S. Supreme Court and the Negotiation of an Outsider Point of Entry in Walker v. City of
Birmingham, 44 FREE SPEECH Y.B. 107, 108 (2010).
71. Id. at 115.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 116.
74. KLARMAN, supra note 10, at 18–19; see, e.g., Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn.
1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972) (mem.), overruled by Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S.
644 (2015).
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marriage were never taken seriously in court until the 1990s.75 During
the 1990s, in response to lawsuits that various same-sex couples
brought, the supreme courts in both Hawaii and Vermont considered
the possibility of same-sex marriage. The Hawaii Supreme Court
indicated that the government needed to satisfy strict scrutiny, the
highest level of judicial review, to limit marriage to only different-sex
couples, but the public approved a constitutional amendment to allow
the Hawaii Legislature to limit marriage to only different-sex couples
without government satisfaction of the strict scrutiny test.76 The
Vermont Supreme Court struck down the exclusion of same-sex
couples from the benefits of marriage but allowed the Vermont
Legislature to provide for civil unions with those benefits, which it did
shortly thereafter.77
The Plaintiffs who brought the Goodridge case were the next in a
line of litigants to agitate a state supreme court for the right to marry
civilly and thus to become part of the larger movement for sexual
minority rights. These Plaintiffs were Julie Goodridge, David Wilson,
Robert Compton, Michael Horgan, Edward Balmelli, Maureen
Brodoff, Ellen Wade, Gary Chalmers, Richard Linnell, Heidi Norton,
Gina Smith, Gloria Bailey, and Linda Davies.78 Mary L. Bonauto,
counsel for the Plaintiffs, indicated, “At its core, Goodridge [was] a
case about real people and real families who asked their government
to treat them equally and fairly.”79
In Goodridge, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court was
fractured in responding to the Plaintiffs’ agitation. Four of the seven
justices were receptive to the Plaintiffs’ arguments for same-sex
marriage, while three justices were not receptive to those arguments.
Thus, engagement occurred among members of the Court, and the
fracturing on the Court provided the point of entry for the outsiders.
Not only did a point of entry develop, but, in a wide-open case
with little precedent, the majority of the Supreme Judicial Court,
although not the social movement itself, played a role in furthering the
75. JASON PIERCESON, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: THE ROAD TO THE
SUPREME COURT 87 (2013).
76. KLARMAN, supra note 10, at 56, 65–66; see Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993)
(plurality opinion), superseded by constitutional amendment, HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23, abrogated
by Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015).
77. KLARMAN, supra note 10, at 76–79; see Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
78. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d. 941, 949 (Mass. 2003).
79. Mary L. Bonauto, Goodridge in Context, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 1 (2005).
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social movement for same-sex marriage. By virtue of the power of
judicial review, via which judges can review acts of other branches of
government,80 the majority functioned as an agent of change on behalf
of the social movement. Although partially institutionalized, the social
movement for same-sex marriage had not become fully
institutionalized because, in addition to the dissenting members of the
Court, the Governor and many members of the Legislature did not
agree with the decision of the majority of the Court.81 Also, most
people in the country did not support same-sex marriage.82 President
Bush even criticized Goodridge in the State of the Union Address two
months after the decision.83 Thus, the matter was not the case of an
institution that decided to reform itself, nor was it the case of a social
movement that had become the norm. Rather, the movement for samesex marriage had gained an important ally in the majority of the Court
for an ongoing struggle, and the struggle would continue in part
because of the strong negative responses from other components of
the establishment, including other branches, or parts of them, of the
Massachusetts government and two branches of the federal
government. Presumably, many of the elected officials were
responding in a manner expressive of their constituents’ views.
To examine how the justices on a fractured Court rhetorically
engaged each other and how the majority supported the movement for
same-sex marriage, this section of the Article looks at the controlling
opinion by Chief Justice Margaret Marshall, which Justices Roderick
Ireland and Judith Cowin joined, the concurring opinion by Justice
John Greaney, and the dissenting opinions by Justices Francis Spina,
Martha Sosman, and Robert Cordy. Justice Marshall’s opinion only
80. WILLIAM E. NELSON, MARBURY V. MADISON: THE ORIGINS AND LEGACY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 1 (2000). Judicial review dates back to 1610 in England, when Edward Coke crafted his
opinion in Bonham’s Case. Id. at 34–35. Although judicial review did not become established in
England at that time, it did eventually make its way to the Colonies. Id. at 35–36. In the future
United States, judicial review dates back to 1761, when Massachusetts attorney James Otis argued
for the principle in Paxton v. Gray. Id. During the 1780s and 1790s, state courts began to accept
the concept of judicial review. Id. at 36–37. After having assumed, but not having decided, in two
1790s cases that it had the power of judicial review, the U.S. Supreme Court, speaking through the
voice of Chief Justice John Marshall, officially accepted judicial review in 1803. Id. at 37; Marbury
v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). For better or worse, judicial review became a permanent part of the
constitutional landscape in the United States. Frank I. Michelman, Living with Judicial Supremacy,
38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 579, 593 (2003).
81. Phillips & Klein, supra note 38.
82. Masci, supra note 37.
83. See Bush, supra note 17.
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had three votes, but Justice Greaney indicated in his concurrence that
he “agree[d] with the result reached by the court, the remedy ordered,
and much of the reasoning in the court’s opinion,”84 so the result that
Marshall’s opinion announced carried the day in setting precedent in
Massachusetts that became available to supreme courts in states across
the United States. At the heart of the conflict between the majority and
the dissenters were the nature of the right at stake and the role, if any,
that the Court should play in guaranteeing that right.
A. Chief Justice Margaret Marshall’s Controlling Opinion
As the ensuing discussion will show, Chief Justice Marshall
focused her groundbreaking opinion on discrimination against sexual
minorities and the Court’s power of judicial review to vindicate
minority rights in constitutional cases. She refused to accept
arguments that might have justified limiting the right to marriage for
sexual minorities. Of note, she also attempted to humanize the
Plaintiffs.
Marshall was an immigrant to the United States from South
Africa.85 During a high school study abroad experience in
Wilmington, Delaware, she received encouragement to think for
herself, which could have led to trouble in apartheid-era South
Africa.86 When she later returned to the States for graduate school, she
became involved in opposing the Vietnam War and promoting the
women’s movement.87 Nonetheless, she had a traditional career for a
Yale law graduate, which included the private practice of law, general
counsel work for Harvard, and membership on the bench.88 Thus, one
might see Marshall as “a combination of the ultimate establishment
figure and the ultimate anti-establishment figure.”89
In her Goodridge opinion, Marshall stated the key question in the
case as “whether, consistent with the Massachusetts Constitution, the
Commonwealth may deny the protections, benefits, and obligations

84. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 970 (Mass. 2003) (Greaney, J.,
concurring).
85. Nina Totenberg, Former Mass. Chief Justice on Life, Liberty, and Gay Marriage, NAT’L
PUB. RADIO (June 7, 2013, 3:25 AM), http://www.npr.org/2013/06/07/189288605/former-masschief-justice-on-life-liberty-and-gay-marriage.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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conferred by civil marriage to two individuals of the same sex who
wish to marry.”90 In answering in the negative, she noted that the
Massachusetts Constitution disallowed “the creation of second-class
citizens.”91
The chief justice endeavored to frame the terms of the discussion
in a focused manner. She recognized that many different individuals
held “religious, moral, and ethical convictions” against and in favor of
same sex marriage.92 Nonetheless, she indicated, perhaps not entirely
honestly, that the Supreme Judicial Court had to base its decision on
the Massachusetts Constitution rather than on personal views.93 In
making this pitch for judicial credibility, she suggested that personal
views somehow did not inform a justice’s reading of the relevant but
vague provisions of the Constitution. For this general principle by
which judges supposedly avoid bringing their views to decisionmaking, she cited the U.S. Supreme Court’s then-recent decision in
Lawrence v. Texas,94 which earlier that year had struck down a Texas
anti-sodomy law aimed only at sexual minorities.95
Likely to address negative stereotypes of sexual minorities,
Marshall made an effort to present the fourteen Plaintiffs in the most
favorable light possible. She noted that, at the time the case had been
filed, the individuals in the seven couples had been in committed
romantic relationships for thirty, twenty, thirteen, thirteen, eleven,
seven, and four years.96 The Plaintiffs were also professional people
in business, law, banking, education, therapy, and engineering, and the
Plaintiffs were active in their communities.97
The specific statute in question was Massachusetts General Law
Chapter 207, which Marshall construed to restrict civil marriage to
different-sex couples.98 She admitted that, traditionally in the
Commonwealth, different-sex coupling had been the understanding of
civil marriage.99 Nonetheless, the relevant constitutional question
called for consideration of the equal protection and due process
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003).
Id.
Id.
Id.
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
Id. at 578.
Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 949.
Id.
Id. at 952–53.
Id.

(9) 54.2_PEDRIOLI.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

530

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

4/23/21 9:51 AM

[Vol. 54:515

provisions in the Commonwealth’s Constitution, which frequently
overlapped.100
Marshall considered the nature of civil marriage, a “wholly
secular institution” that the government created.101 In effect, marriage
involved the Commonwealth and two spouses.102 The institution came
with many benefits, including joint income filing for state taxes,
tenancy by the entirety, extension of the homestead exemption to
one’s spouse and children, inheritance rights in the absence of a
spousal will, and numerous other benefits that Marshall listed.103
Calling upon the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Loving v.
Virginia,104 which had protected the right to marry under both the
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution,105 Marshall described marriage
as “a ‘civil right.’”106
The chief justice looked at the history of discrimination in
marriage laws, noting that racial discrimination had been a major
ingredient in laws that had restricted marriage.107 She observed that
both the U.S. Supreme Court in Loving and the California Supreme
Court nearly twenty years earlier in Perez v. Sharp108 had struck down
anti-miscegenation laws.109 Analogizing sexual orientation to race,
she stated, “[H]istory must yield to a more fully developed
understanding of the invidious quality of the discrimination.”110 The
majoritarian impulse was not enough to prevent the judiciary from
protecting minority rights.111
Because the reasons that the Department of Public Health and
various amici curiae offered would fail rational basis review,112 the
most deferential of all standards of judicial review of government
100. Id. at 953.
101. Id. at 954.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 955–57.
104. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
105. Id. at 11–12.
106. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 957.
107. Id. at 958.
108. 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948) (also known as Perez v. Lippold).
109. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 958.
110. Id.
111. See id. at 958 n.16.
112. As Justice Cordy noted, Marshall reversed the burden of proof in a case in which she
claimed the standard of review was rational basis. Id. at 998 n.21 (Cordy, J., dissenting). In such a
case, the burden of proof is on the challenger, not the government. Id.
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action, Marshall would not subject those reasons to strict scrutiny, the
most exacting standard of judicial review.113 Even under the
deferential standard of rational basis, state due process or equal
protection rights were violated.114
The chief justice responded to the various arguments in favor of
the law one at a time. First, Marshall disagreed that the main purpose
of marriage was procreation.115 Although she admitted that many, if
not most, couples had children, she pointed out that fertility was not
required for marriage.116 Rather, marriage was defined by an
“exclusive and permanent commitment.”117
Second, Marshall disagreed that heterosexual marriage provided
the optimal setting for having children.118 She observed that the family
in the United States had been changing and was continuing to
change.119 Marshall pointed out that the Department of Public Health
admitted that individuals in same-sex couples could be “‘excellent’
parents.”120 Unfortunately for individuals in same-sex couples, childrearing was made more difficult by exclusion of sexual minorities
from the rights associated with marriage.121
Third, Marshall rejected the assertion that denial of marriage to
same-sex couples would conserve public or private money.122 She said
that the Department of Public Health should not assume that
individuals in same-sex relationships were any more independent from
each other, and thus less in need of marital benefits like tax advantages
and health care, than individuals in different-sex relationships were.123
Additionally, beyond the reasons that the Department of Public
Health proffered, Marshall examined various reasons for the law that
amici curiae advanced, and she rejected all of them.124 Although
admitting that change may have been in the air in light of the Court’s
eventual vote, she denied that granting the right to same-sex marriage
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id. at 961 (controlling opinion).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 962.
Id. at 962–63.
Id. at 963.
Id.
Id. at 964.
Id.
Id. at 964–67.
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would destroy civil marriage.125 Calling upon race as an analogy, she
stated that the Plaintiffs were not attempting to do away with marriage
for heterosexual individuals any more than individuals who sought
interracial marriage had been trying to prohibit individuals of the same
race from marrying each other.126
Focusing specifically on judicial review in constitutional cases,
Marshall disagreed that the Massachusetts Legislature should decide
the issue.127 “We owe great deference to the Legislature to decide
social and policy issues,” she noted, “but it is the traditional and settled
role of courts to decide constitutional issues.”128 Marshall indicated
that, in constitutional cases, the courts should promote “the extension
of constitutional rights and protections to people once ignored or
excluded.”129
Finally, Marshall rejected two other amici arguments.130 In terms
of the interstate conflict that could result because of the legalization of
same-sex marriage in Massachusetts, the chief justice said that such
consideration should not prevent the Court “from according
Massachusetts residents the full measure of protection available under
the Massachusetts Constitution.”131 In terms of a supposed community
consensus against intimate same-sex conduct, Marshall pointed to
various Commonwealth laws against discrimination based on sexual
orientation, including those in the areas of employment, housing,
public accommodation, public education, and others.132
In short, Marshall concluded that the Department of Public Health
and amici curiae had failed to present a rational basis for the denial of
marriage licenses to same-sex couples.133 “The marriage ban,” she
commented, “works a deep and scarring hardship on a very real
segment of the community for no rational reason.”134 Marshall
recognized that “[p]rivate biases may be outside the reach of the law,
125. Id. at 965.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 965–66.
128. Id. at 966.
129. Id. (quoting United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 557 (1996) (addressing discrimination
against women at the Virginia Military Institute, a public institution of higher education that
admitted only men)).
130. Id. at 967.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 968.
134. Id.
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but [that] the law [could] not, directly or indirectly, give them
effect.”135
Having found no reason to deny the Plaintiffs relief, Marshall
turned to the matter of remedy. She noted that the Supreme Judicial
Court faced a similar problem as the Court of Appeal for Ontario had
earlier that year in Halpern v. Attorney General of Canada,136 when
the latter court had reviewed a same-sex marriage ban in light of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.137 Like the members of the
Court of Appeal for Ontario, Marshall opted to modify the commonlaw definition of marriage to include same-sex couples.138 The revised
definition of civil marriage in Massachusetts would be “the voluntary
union of two persons as spouses, to the exclusion of all others.”139 The
case would be remanded to the lower court for entry of judgment in
favor of the Plaintiffs, but entry would be stayed for 180 days so that
the Massachusetts Legislature could “take such action as it may deem
appropriate in light of this opinion.”140
B. Justice John Greaney’s Concurrence
As noted above, Justice Greaney “agree[d] with the result reached
by the court, the remedy ordered, and much of the reasoning in the
court’s opinion.”141 However, as the following discussion will show,
he sought to place more attention on the equal protection analysis.
What he saw as sex-based discrimination called for careful judicial
review. Additionally, he responded to arguments based on tradition,
and he rejected original intent as a means of constitutional
interpretation. Finally, Greaney made an emotional plea for
acceptance of the sexual minorities who sought civil marriage.
Article 1 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, modified by
Article 106 of the Amendments to the Commonwealth’s Constitution,
protected against discrimination based on sex, race, color, religion, or
135. Id. (quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984)).
136. (2003), 65 O.R. 3d 161 (Can. Ont. C.A.).
137. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 969. For discussions of the history of same-sex marriage in
Canada, see, for example, Christy M. Glass & Nancy Kubasek, The Evolution of Same-Sex
Marriage in Canada: Lessons the U.S. Can Learn from Their Northern Neighbor Regarding SameSex Marriage Rights, 15 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 143, 160–73 (2008); R. Douglas Elliott, The
Canadian Earthquake: Same-Sex Marriage in Canada, 38 NEW ENG. L. REV. 591, 609–19 (2004).
138. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 969.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 969–70.
141. Id. at 970 (Greaney, J., concurring).
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national origin.142 According to Greaney, this was “a straightforward
case of discrimination that disqualifie[d] an entire group of our
citizens and their families from participation in an institution of
paramount legal and social importance.”143
Greaney described civil marriage not as a privilege conferred by
the state, but as a fundamental right.144 To support this proposition, he
cited several U.S. Supreme Court cases, including Loving, the decision
that had struck down anti-miscegenation statutes.145
The concurring justice considered the classification as one based
on the sex of the two individuals who sought to marry.146 For example,
Hillary Goodridge could not marry Julie Goodridge because the
former was a woman.147 In the same way, Gary Chalmers could not
marry Richard Linnell because the former was a man.148 For authority,
Greaney cited opinions from the justices on the Hawaii Supreme Court
and the Vermont Supreme Court, both of which had considered samesex marriage in the 1990s.149 Greaney expressed concern with the
view that a sexual minority was not denied the right to marriage
because the individual could find a different-sex partner.150
Greaney’s analysis regarding sex-based discrimination was
slightly different from that of Justice Denise Johnson in Baker v.
State,151 a similar case that the Vermont Supreme Court had decided
in 1999 without requiring same-sex marriage.152 In her opinion,
Justice Johnson had noted that a woman could not marry another
woman because the prospective marital partner was a woman.153
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Greaney treated the words sex and gender as synonyms. Id. at 970–71. From an academic
perspective, this is inaccurate. Although the terms overlap, sex is a biologically-based designation,
and gender is a social construction and expression. JULIA T. WOOD, GENDERED LIVES:
COMMUNICATION, GENDER, AND CULTURE 20–21 (9th ed. 2011). For a discussion of sex and
gender, see id. at 20–27.
147. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 971 (Greaney, J., concurring).
148. Id.
149. Id. (citing Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (plurality opinion), superseded by
constitutional amendment, HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23, abrogated by Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S.
644 (2015); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 897 (Vt. 1999) (Johnson, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part)).
150. Id.
151. 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
152. See generally id. at 867.
153. Id. at 905 (Johnson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Likewise, a man could not marry another man because the prospective
martial partner was a man.154 As Johnson had seen it, since the law did
not inquire into sexual practices or identities, the discrimination was
based on sex, not sexual orientation.155 Still, the two justices agreed
that sex-based discrimination was at play in their respective cases.
Seeing an infringement of a fundamental right and a sex-based
classification, Greaney applied strict scrutiny, the highest level of
judicial review of the government action.156 Thus, the government had
to show “a compelling purpose furthered by the statutes that [could]
be accomplished in no other reasonable manner.”157
Greaney noted that couples had a right to have children,
regardless of sexual orientation or marital status.158 Since the
Commonwealth’s policy of denying marriage to same-sex couples
impacted the legal protections and benefits of children of same-sex
couples, Greaney saw a “caste-like system” that was “irreconcilable
with, indeed, totally repugnant to, the State’s strong interest in the
welfare of all children.”159
The concurring justice addressed the arguments based on
tradition. He responded to such arguments by noting the following:
To define the institution of marriage by the characteristics of
those to whom it always has been accessible, in order to
justify the exclusion of those to whom it never has been
accessible, is conclusory and bypasses the core question we
are asked to decide. This case calls for a higher level of legal
analysis. Precisely, the case requires that we confront
ingrained assumptions with respect to historically accepted
roles of men and women within the institution of
marriage . . . .160
Citing the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas,
Greaney stated that the current case was about constitutional law, not
tradition.161

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id.
Id.
Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 972 (Greaney, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 972–73.
Id. at 973.

(9) 54.2_PEDRIOLI.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

536

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

4/23/21 9:51 AM

[Vol. 54:515

On a related note, Greaney considered the original intent behind
revising Article I. He recognized that such an intent had not been to
promote same-sex marriage.162 Regardless, Greaney specifically said
that he did not accept the philosophy of the original intent school of
constitutional interpretation.163 The views of one time, the concurring
justice believed, should not be allowed to discriminate against
individuals who live in another time, and equal protection principles
should control.164
Greaney concluded his opinion with an emotional plea that those
who opposed same-sex marriage would come to accept the Court’s
decision.165 “The plaintiffs,” he noted, “volunteer in our schools,
worship beside us in our religious houses, and have children who play
with our children . . . .” 166 He added, “We share a common humanity
and participate together in the social contract that is the foundation of
our Commonwealth. Simple principles of decency dictate that we
extend to the plaintiffs, and to their new status, full acceptance,
tolerance, and respect.”167
C. Justice Francis Spina’s Dissent
Consideration of the three dissenting opinions in Goodridge
makes apparent the Court’s fracturing in response to the Plaintiffs’
agitation. As the ensuing discussion will show, in his dissent, Justice
Spina saw the case as one in which the Court had usurped the power
of the Legislature. He believed that the Legislature had the power to
regulate marriage, while the Court was supposed to protect, not create,
individual rights. Social change should come from the Legislature, not
the judiciary.
Spina considered both equal protection and due process grounds
for the lawsuit. He did not see a case for equal protection, either based
on sex or sexual orientation.168 In terms of sex-based
discrimination,169 he did not see that the government was treating

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id. at 974 n.6.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 973.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 974–75 (Spina, J., dissenting).
Like Greaney, Spina used the words sex and gender as synonyms. Id.
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either sex differently.170 Indeed, “both men and women [were]
similarly limited to marrying a person of the opposite sex.”171 In terms
of sexual orientation, he did not see any discrimination either.172 Spina
said, “All individuals, with certain exceptions not relevant here, are
free to marry. Whether an individual chooses not to marry because of
sexual orientation or any other reason should be of no concern to the
court.”173 Apparently, it was not necessary to consider if a sexual
minority would wish to marry someone of the other sex.
The dissenting justice addressed the Loving decision that
Marshall and Greaney used in their opinions. Spina indicated that, in
Loving, the U.S. Supreme Court had not addressed the matter of
marrying a person of the same sex.174 Moreover, the government in
the present case had not intended to discriminate based on sexual
orientation, as the Commonwealth of Virginia had intended to
discriminate based on race in Loving.175
As with equal protection, Spina did not see a case for due
process.176 From Spina’s perspective, everyone, regardless of sexual
orientation, was free to enter a civil marriage with someone of the
other sex.177 Again, it was apparently not necessary to consider if a
sexual minority would wish to do so.
To develop the due process analysis, Spina considered the nature
of the right to determine what level of judicial review should be
applied to the government action.178 If a fundamental right were
involved, then strict scrutiny should apply.179 If no fundamental right
were involved, then rational basis would apply.180 To determine if the
right to same-sex marriage were fundamental, Spina called upon
tradition, asking whether that right was “deeply rooted in this Nation’s
history.”181 Clearly, the answer was that such a right was not.182 In the
Commonwealth itself, the Legislature, when addressing the problem
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Id. at 974.
Id.
Id. at 975.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 976–77.
Id. at 976.
Id.
Id. (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997)).
Id.
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of workplace discrimination based on sexual orientation, had indicated
that the Legislature had no intent to validate same-sex marriage.183
Spina believed that, in granting same-sex marriage to sexual
minorities, the Court was exceeding its power.184 He asserted, “Such
a dramatic change in social institutions must remain at the behest of
the people through the democratic process.”185 The dissenting justice
spoke of “judicial restraint” and “separation of powers.”186 For an
example of what the Court should have done, he referenced a thenrecent case in which the Court had refused to extend health insurance
to domestic partners because the matter was one of policy.187 The
creation of new rights was for the people via the Legislature.188
D. Justice Martha Sosman’s Dissent
Like the dissent of Justice Spina, the dissent of Justice Sosman
helped to facilitate the Court’s fracturing in response to the agitation
of the Plaintiffs. As the following discussion will show, Sosman
focused on deference to the Legislature in the area of civil marriage.
Still, despite her deferential legal stance, Sosman expressed her
personal empathies toward sexual minorities who sought access to
civil marriage.
Sosman clarified that, when the Court applied rational basis
review, which she believed appropriate,189 to the applicable statute,
“the issue [was] not whether the Legislature’s rationale behind that
scheme [was] persuasive to [the Court], but only whether it satisfie[d]
a minimal threshold of rationality.”190 That some parents were raising
children outside the parameters of traditional civil marriage, which
those parents were free to do, did not mean that the Legislature had to
provide full marital benefits to all households.191
The dissenting justice suggested that she was not personally
opposed to the idea that same-sex couples were raising children.192
Sosman said that, for children, “a nurturing, stable, safe, consistent,
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Id. at 976–77.
Id. at 977–78.
Id. at 977.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 978.
Id. at 981 (Sosman, J., dissenting).
Id. at 978.
Id. at 979.
Id.
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and supportive environment in which to mature” mattered more than
“the gender, or sexual orientation, or even the number of the adults
who raise them.”193 She expressed understanding that the four justices
who constituted the majority vote saw “the traditional definition of
marriage as an unnecessary anachronism, rooted in historical
prejudices that modern society has in large measure rejected and
biological limitations that modern science has overcome.”194
Claiming to put aside a personal assessment, a credibility move
similar to that of Chief Justice Marshall, Sosman turned to scientific
studies on the impact of raising children in same-sex couple
households.195 She indicated that the studies were relatively new and
not conclusive.196 Moreover, the studies were controversial.197 She
noted, “This is hardly the first time in history that the ostensible steel
of the scientific method has melted and buckled under the intense heat
of political and religious passions.”198 The Legislature, which had
created civil marriage, was entitled to review the evidence before
making a change to the institution of marriage.199
Sosman believed that Marshall’s opinion went beyond applying
rational basis review to the statute and applied “some undefined
stricter standard.”200 She colorfully commented the following:
[W]hile claiming to apply a mere rational basis test, the
court's opinion works up an enormous head of steam by
repeated invocations of avenues by which to subject the
statute to strict scrutiny, apparently hoping that that head of
steam will generate momentum sufficient to propel the
opinion across the yawning chasm of the very deferential
rational basis test.201
The dissenting justice tried to divorce the rational and emotional
aspects of persuasion. She suggested that the four justices in the
majority had let their emotions get the better of them because of the
subject matter of the case.202 She drew an analogy between, on one
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 980.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 981.
Id.
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hand, same-sex marriage and, on the other hand, subsidies and tax
credits for use of energy-efficient heating, both of which she believed
should be reviewed under the rational basis standard.203 If the
government provided financial incentives for using established
heating methods as opposed to novel heating methods, according to
Sosman, the four justices in the majority would not have seen a
violation of the rational basis review standard.204 Sosman claimed that
the justices in the majority should have been functioning logically
instead of emotionally.205
As such, the Legislature should have had the opportunity to
decide the matter.206 Particularly, the Legislature should have been
able to determine whether a risk existed of “damaging the institution
of marriage or adversely affecting the critical role it has played in our
society.”207 Then the Legislature could decide if “a fundamental
alteration” to civil marriage were appropriate.208
In the conclusion to her opinion, Sosman made several important
additional concessions. She acknowledged that the Court’s decision
might “represent a great turning point that many w[ould] hail as a
tremendous step toward a more just society.”209 She added that there
was “much to be said for the argument that excluding gay and lesbian
couples from the benefits of civil marriage [was] cruelly unfair and
hopelessly outdated.”210 She also admitted that she and her fellow
dissenting justices were close to sexual minorities who were “friends,
neighbors, family members, classmates, and co-workers.”211
E. Justice Robert Cordy’s Dissent
Justice Cordy’s dissent, the third and final dissent in the case,
further facilitated the Court’s fracturing in response to the agitation of
the Plaintiffs. As the ensuing discussion will show, Cordy felt that the
Court should have deferred to the Legislature because of the lesser
nature of the right at stake. He acknowledged that it may have been

203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 982.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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beneficial to allow sexual minorities to marry, but he did not want the
Court to make that change.
Cordy determined that no fundamental right was at issue.212
According to common law tradition, marriage was an institution that
the Commonwealth had created.213 Although marriage in general was
a fundamental right, there was not necessarily a right to marry
someone of the same sex.214 The contexts for famous U.S. Supreme
Court cases cited for this proposition, including Skinner v. Oklahoma
ex rel. Williamson,215 Griswold v. Connecticut,216 and Loving, were
heterosexual in nature.217 Cordy noted that U.S. Supreme Court
decisions that spoke of marriage as a fundamental right had linked
marriage with procreation.218
To support his conclusion that no fundamental right was at issue,
Cordy focused heavily on tradition. Calling upon U.S. Supreme Court
case law, he noted that fundamental rights often were “so deeply
rooted in our history and traditions.”219 Although marriage was so
rooted in history and tradition, same-sex marriage was not.220
In light of this analysis, Cordy pondered whether the Supreme
Judicial Court should recognize a new right of marriage for same-sex
couples. Expressing concern over allowing judges to have their policy
preferences, the dissenting justice cautioned against the judiciary’s
recognizing new rights.221 Again, he went back to tradition, noting that
both the U.S. Supreme Court and the Supreme Judicial Court had
limited their recognition of new rights.222
Cordy looked at recent legislation on same-sex marriage to
determine whether “contemporary values ha[d] embraced the concept
of same-sex marriage.”223 He admitted that marriage in general was in
a state of flux, but he did not see an indication that the public supported
same-sex marriage.224 He noted that, as of the early 2000s, no state
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

Id. at 983 (Cordy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 984.
Id.
316 U.S. 535 (1942).
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 984 (Cordy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 985.
Id. at 987 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 727 (1997)).
Id.
Id. at 988–89.
Id. at 989–90.
Id. at 990.
Id.
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legislature had enacted a law that allowed same-sex marriage.225
However, thirty-six states had enacted statutes to prohibit recognizing
same-sex marriage, as had Congress through the Defense of Marriage
Act.226 These legislative pronouncements, presumably the will of the
people in the respective jurisdictions, did not support same-sex
marriage.227
In addition to arguing that a fundamental right was not at issue,
Cordy argued that, under the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) to the
Commonwealth’s Constitution, no suspect classification was at
issue.228 Because there was no purpose to treat or effect of treating
men or women differently, Cordy maintained that no sex-based
discrimination was at work.229
To bolster this conclusion, Cordy looked back at the history of the
Commonwealth’s ERA. He noted that the commission that had studied
the ERA in the 1970s had indicated that the then-proposed amendment
would “have no effect upon the allowance or denial of homosexual
marriages.”230 As indicated in the Boston Globe during the 1970s, the
public debate that surrounded the passage of the ERA had reflected
the view of the commission.231 As such, Cordy cautioned the Court
against “completely disregarding what appear[ed] to be the clear intent
of the people recently recorded in our constitutional history.”232
Not finding a fundamental right to same-sex marriage or a suspect
classification, Cordy endeavored to review the marriage statute for
rationality.233 He noted that a heavy burden was on the Plaintiffs.234
Under a rational basis review, the judiciary generally had to defer to

225. Id.
226. Id.; see Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996), invalidated by
United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013) (striking down Section 3, which contained the
heterosexual-only federal definition of marriage) and Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015)
(superseding Section 2, which allowed sibling states not to recognize same-sex marriages from
other states).
227. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 990 (Cordy, J., dissenting).
228. Id. at 991.
229. Id. at 991–92. Like Greaney and Spina, Cordy treated the words sex and gender as
synonyms. Id.
230. Id. at 993 (quoting COMMONWEALTH OF MASS., SPECIAL STUDY COMM’N ON THE EQUAL
RTS. AMENDMENT, FIRST INTERIM REPORT, S. 1689, Reg. Sess., at 21 (1976)).
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
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the public’s will carried out through the Legislature.235 This point was
a matter of separation of powers within the state government.236
In terms of the nature of the classification, Cordy claimed that the
classification was based on the type of couple, whether same-sex or
different-sex, and not on sex or sexual orientation.237 To him, that the
type of couple was a function of the sexual orientations of the two
adults who constituted the couple apparently did not matter.
Cordy looked at the purposes of the marriage statute.238 Civil
marriage, he noted, had been “the institutional mechanism by which
societies ha[d] sanctioned and recognized particular family structures,
and the institution of marriage ha[d] existed as one of the fundamental
organizing principles of human society.”239 Cordy again emphasized
that procreation had been a key component of civil marriage.240 He
referenced Inhabitants of Milford v. Inhabitants of Worcester,241 a
case that the Court had decided almost two hundred years earlier, for
the idea that “civil marriage [had been] ‘intended to regulate, chasten,
and refine, the intercourse between the sexes; and to multiply,
preserve, and improve the species.’”242 Society without marriage
“would be chaotic,” Cordy claimed.243 Despite recent changes
regarding marriage, the institution still provided for “an optimal social
structure within which to bear and raise children.”244
The Court, along with other courts, had recognized both
“marriage as an organizing principle of society” and the state’s interest
in regulating marriage.245 Cordy cited various opinions that ranged
from the Court’s Milford v. Worcester decision to U.S. Supreme Court
decisions from the 1870s and 1880s.246 In one such case from the
1870s, Reynolds v. United States,247 the U.S. Supreme Court had
235. Id. at 994.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. See id. at 994–97.
239. Id. at 995.
240. Id.
241. 7 Mass. 48 (1810).
242. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 995 (Cordy, J., dissenting) (citing Inhabitants of Milford, 7
Mass. at 52). Cordy did admit that, in a modern world with contraception, heterosexual intercourse
and procreation were not always “conjoined.” Id.
243. Id. at 996.
244. Id. at 997.
245. Id. at 996.
246. Id. at 996–97.
247. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
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decided that Congress could regulate plural marriage in the Utah
Territory, regardless of the First Amendment free exercise of religion
defense that had been raised.248
Cordy looked for a connection between the state’s restriction of
marriage as only different-sex in nature and the state’s interest in
“supporting an optimal social structure for the bearing and raising of
children.”249 Again, he stated that the Court should defer to the
Legislature.250 Cordy noted that, in adopting the rational basis
standard of review in her opinion, Marshall had misallocated the
burden of proof by placing it on the Department of Public Health.251
The dissenting justice pointed out that various empirical studies
of children raised by couples of different sexual orientations were not
conclusive regarding the impact on children of different-sex versus
same-sex parenting.252 Also, the research methodologies of the studies
had received criticism, and political preferences had impacted the
studies.253 Thus, he indicated that, at least for the present, the
Legislature could conclude that civil marriage should remain a
different-sex institution.254
On a related note, Cordy claimed that, even though the
Commonwealth allowed same-sex couples to adopt children, such a
policy should not require that the Commonwealth allow same-sex
couples to marry.255 Allowing different types of families to adopt did
not necessarily mean that the Commonwealth had to “view them all as
equally optimal and equally deserving of State endorsement and
support.”256
Furthermore, Cordy speculated that the Legislature could have
concluded that allowing same-sex couples to marry might “impair the
State’s interest in promoting and supporting heterosexual marriage as
the social institution that it has determined best normalizes, stabilizes,
and links the acts of procreation and child rearing.”257 With the current

248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.

Id. at 162, 166–67.
Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 998 (Cordy, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 998 n.21.
Id. at 998–99.
Id. at 999.
Id. at 1000.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1001–02.
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policy, the Legislature communicated the following “consistent
message” to the members of the Commonwealth public:
[T]hat marriage is a (normatively) necessary part of their
procreative endeavor; that if they are to procreate, then
society has endorsed the institution of marriage as the
environment for it and for the subsequent rearing of their
children; and that benefits are available explicitly to create a
supportive and conducive atmosphere for those purposes.258
Once again, Cordy insisted that “[p]rocreation ha[d] always been at
the root of marriage,” and he took Marshall to task for disconnecting
marriage and procreation.259 Marshall, he wrote, had “turn[ed] history
on its head.”260
Given the above, Cordy urged gradualism. For example, even
though the Commonwealth had promoted a policy against
discrimination based on sexual orientation, Massachusetts should
have time to experiment with the idea of same-sex marriage.261 A rush
to change would allow “those who argue[d] ‘slippery slope’ [to] have
more ammunition than ever to resist any effort at progressive change
or social experimentation.”262
Despite his stance against judicial recognition of same-sex
marriage, Cordy concluded with several concessions to sexual
minorities. He admitted, “There is no question that many same-sex
couples are capable of being good parents, and should be (and are)
permitted to be so.”263 He added, “The advancement of the rights,
privileges, and protections afforded to homosexual members of our
community in the last three decades has been significant, and there is
no reason to believe that that evolution will not continue.”264
IV. THE ADVISORY OPINIONS AS JUDICIAL RESPONSES TO A
LEGISLATIVE ATTEMPT AT CONTROL
Not only was the Supreme Judicial Court, the leading institution
in the judicial branch of state government, fractured in responding to
the Plaintiffs’ agitation, but the overall government of the
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.

Id. at 1002.
Id. at 1002 n.34.
Id.
Id. at 1001 n.33.
Id.
Id. at 1003.
Id. at 1004.
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Commonwealth was likewise fractured. While the majority of the
Court supported same-sex marriage, Governor Romney supported a
state constitutional ban on same-sex marriage,265 and the Legislature,
itself divided, would soon meet in a state constitutional convention to
debate such an amendment,266 which it also had done in 2002,
although then without a vote.267 The Governor was very much against
same-sex marriage.268
Romney’s wish for a constitutional amendment looked as though
it might be granted, but an amendment ultimately failed to clear all of
the required hurdles to changing the Constitution. In March 2004, the
Legislature, sitting in a constitutional convention, passed a
constitutional amendment to ban same-sex marriage but to allow civil
unions for same-sex couples.269 However, the proposed amendment
needed to pass again during the next legislative session and then be
submitted to the people for approval.270 In September 2005, the
amendment was defeated with both houses of the Legislature gathered
for another constitutional convention.271 A later attempt by the
Legislature to pass a constitutional amendment, which had originated
as an initiative petition instead of within the Legislature, eventually
failed, but only after the amendment passed the first time.272

265. Phillips & Klein, supra note 38.
266. Frank Phillips & Raphael Lewis, Two Marriage Amendments Fail; Lawmakers to
Reconvene Today: Debate Exposes Deep Divisions, BOS. GLOBE (Feb. 12, 2004), http://www.bos
ton.com/news/specials/gay_marriage/articles/2004/02/12/two_marriage_amendments_fail_lawma
kers_to_reconvene_today/; Scott S. Greenberger, Vote on Travis Measure Shows Split on Gay
Marriage, BOS. GLOBE (Feb. 13, 2004), http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/article
s/2004/02/13/vote_on_travis_measure_shows_split_on_gay_marriage/.
267. Denise Lavoie, Mass. Court: Gay Marriage Question Can Move Forward, BARRE
MONTPELIER TIMES ARGUS (July 11, 2006), https://www.timesargus.com/news/mass-court-gaymarriage-question-can-move-forward/article_ba2a4ba5-1019-5374-85ee-e5a09d2db7cd.html (last
updated Oct. 17, 2018).
268. Rick Klein, Gridlock in Marriage Debate: Deeply Split Mass. Legislature to Reconvene
in March Session, BOS. GLOBE (Feb. 13, 2004), http://archive.boston.com/news/specials/gay_mar
riage/articles/2004/02/13/gridlock_in_marriage_debate/.
269. Klein, supra note 23.
270. MASS. CONST. arts. of amends. art. XLVIII, pt. IV, §§ 1–2, 4–5.
271. Belluck, supra note 23.
272. Frank Phillips & Lisa Wangsness, Same-Sex Marriage Ban Advances: Lawmakers OK
Item for Ballot, but Hurdle Remains, BOS. GLOBE (Jan. 3, 2007), http://www.boston.com/news/sp
ecials/gay_marriage/articles/2007/01/03/same_sex_marriage_ban_advances/; Frank Phillips &
Andrea Estes, Right of Gays to Marry Set for Years to Come: Vote Keeps Proposed Ban off 2008
State Ballot, BOS. GLOBE (June 15, 2007), http://www.boston.com/news/local/articles/2007/06/15
/right_of_gays_to_marry_set_for_years_to_come/.
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In the immediate wake of the Goodridge decision, and prior to the
Legislature’s passing a constitutional amendment to ban same-sex
marriage, the Massachusetts Senate responded to the fractured
Supreme Judicial Court’s responses to the Plaintiffs’ agitation. The
Senate asked the Court for an advisory opinion regarding whether a
bill that offered same-sex couples civil unions, but not marriages,
would be constitutional.273 According to the proposed bill, Senate No.
2175, a civil union would be the legal equivalent of a marriage,
although the title would be different.274 Senate No. 2175 was a way of
avoiding allowing sexual minorities to marry civilly.
Again, the Court was divided four justices to three, and again the
majority of the Court supported full marriage rights for sexual
minorities. To examine how the justices on a fractured Court
rhetorically engaged each other in responding to the Senate and how
the majority supported the movement for same-sex marriage, this
section of the Article examines Chief Justice Marshall’s majority
opinion for herself and Justices Greaney, Ireland, and Cowin, as well
as the dissent of Justice Sosman that Justice Spina joined and the brief
dissent of Justice Cordy. Once again, the conflict between the majority
and the dissenters involved assumptions about the role of the Court
compared with that of the Legislature.
A. Chief Justice Margaret Marshall’s Majority Opinion
In her advisory opinion, which had echoes of her opinion in
Goodridge, Chief Justice Marshall read Senate No. 2175 as a violation
of the equal protection and due process mandates of the Massachusetts
Constitution.275 She took issue with the government’s “stated purpose
to ‘preserv[e] the traditional, historic nature and meaning of the
institution of civil marriage.’”276 Marshall cited Goodridge for the idea
that the government’s aim should be “to encourage stable adult
relationships for the good of the individual and of the community,
especially its children.”277
Marshall contended that tradition and majority sentiment were
not controlling when state action constituted discrimination.278 While
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.

Ops. of the Justs. to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 566 (Mass. 2004).
Id. at 568.
Id. at 572.
Id. at 569 (quoting S.B. 2175, 183d Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess., at § 1 (Mass. 2003)).
Id.
Id. at 570.
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individuals were free to have their perspectives on same-sex marriage,
the government should not discriminate in light of constitutional
rights.279 Any action to prohibit same-sex couples from being able to
marry would be unconstitutional.280
Furthermore, the chief justice described the proposed bill as an
attempt at “[s]egregating same-sex unions from opposite-sex
unions.”281 She commented, “The history of our nation has
demonstrated that separate is seldom, if ever, equal.”282 Marshall
looked at the different labels used for same-sex and different-sex
couples, noting that the distinction between terms created “secondclass status” for sexual minorities.283 The problem was not the word
union but the distinction drawn between the words marriage and
union,284 and “no amount of tinkering with language” would solve the
problem.285
Additionally, the Court should not interpret the Massachusetts
Constitution based on whether rights recognized within Massachusetts
would be recognized elsewhere. 286 The author of the majority opinion
acknowledged that federal law at that time did not recognize same-sex
marriages and indeed allowed states to decline to recognize same-sex
marriages obtained in other states.287 Marshall was referring to the
Defense of Marriage Act,288 whose provision that restricted the federal
definition of marriage to heterosexual marriage the U.S. Supreme
Court ultimately struck down in United States v. Windsor.289
Nonetheless, the Court had to interpret the Massachusetts
Constitution, subject only to the federal minimum determined by the
U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution.290
279. Id.
280. Id. at 571.
281. Id. at 569.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 569–70.
284. Id. at 570 n.4.
285. Id. at 570.
286. Id. at 571.
287. Id.
288. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996), invalidated by United
States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013) (striking down Section 3, which contained the heterosexualonly federal definition of marriage) and Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) (superseding
Section 2, which allowed sibling states not to recognize same-sex marriages from other states).
289. See generally Windsor, 570 U.S. at 744.
290. Ops. of the Justs. to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d at 571.

(9) 54.2_PEDRIOLI.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

4/23/21 9:51 AM

2021] GOODRIDGE AND MASS. SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT

549

B. Justice Martha Sosman’s Dissent
In her advisory opinion dissent, which Justice Spina joined, and
which had echoes of her dissent in Goodridge, Justice Sosman
revealed the continuing fractured nature of the Court on the matter of
same-sex marriage. She determined that Senate No. 2175 would be
constitutional.
Sosman described the situation before the Court as “a pitched
battle over who gets to use the ‘m’ word.”291 She noted that “[t]he
insignificance of according a different name to the same thing ha[d]
long been recognized.”292 To support this principle, she quoted from
Juliet Capulet in Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet as follows:
“What’s in a name? That which we call a rose
By any other name would smell as sweet;
So Romeo would, were he not Romeo call’d
Retain that dear perfection which he owes
Without that title.”293
The dissenting justice distinguished the current matter over the
word marriage from the matter in Goodridge, in which “none of the
benefits, rights, or privileges” of civil marriage had been available to
sexual minorities.294 By comparison, the current matter, an argument
over labels, was “insignificant.”295 Indeed, Sosman thought that the
term civil union was “perfectly dignified” and “connote[d] no
disrespect.”296
Sosman believed that the deferential rational basis standard of
judicial review applied.297 Because, at that time, other governments in
the country did not recognize same-sex marriage, the Legislature had
a reason for using another term for same-sex unions.298 In terms of
federal law, same-sex couples would not receive recognition for tax,
social security, immigration, or other purposes.299 In terms of state
291. Id. at 572 (Sosman, J., dissenting).
292. Id. at 572 n.1.
293. Id. (quoting WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET, act 2, sc. 2, l. 43–47). For the
context of Juliet’s discussion with Romeo Montague, see, for example, THE COMPLETE WORKS OF
SHAKESPEARE 991–94 (David Bevington ed., 4th ed. 1997).
294. Ops. of the Justs. to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d at 573 (Sosman, J., dissenting).
295. Id. at 573–74.
296. Id. at 578 n.5.
297. Id. at 573.
298. Id. at 575.
299. Id. at 574–75.
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law, other states simply would not recognize same-sex marriages.300
The “difference in terminology reflect[ed] the reality that, for many
purposes, same-sex couples w[ould] have ‘a different status.’”301
Sosman noted that, as of 2004, “no one predict[ed], even under the
most optimistic scenario, that . . . widespread recognition [of marriage
rights for same-sex couples would] be achieved anytime in the near
future.”302 The dissenting justice did acknowledge that some people
would find such different treatment unfair.303
The dissenting justice argued that, even in Massachusetts, the
Legislature might require time to review provisions of the law that
touched on marriage and thus might have need for a different
nomenclature, at least in the short term.304 For instance, Massachusetts
law contained a presumption of paternity, which assumed that a child
born to a married woman was the child of the woman’s husband.305
This presumption would not make sense in a same-sex marriage
context because the presumption was “a physical and biological
impossibility.”306
Additionally, Sosman took the Court, which she described as
“activist . . . in support of th[e] cause” for same-sex marriage, to task
for its analysis.307 She claimed that the Court had turned sexual
orientation into a suspect class.308 Despite the result that it offered,
Goodridge had not recognized sexual orientation as a protected class,
nor had the case declared that same-sex marriage was a fundamental
right.309 With its current advisory opinion, the Court had “discard[ed]
the fig leaf of the rational basis test” and had “rel[ied] exclusively on
the rhetoric rather than the purported reasoning of Goodridge.”310
Sosman did not clarify how rhetoric and reasoning were mutually
exclusive. Perhaps she was referring to Sophistic rhetoric rather than

300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.

Id. at 575.
Id. at 576.
Id. at 576 n.2.
Id. at 575.
Id. at 577.
Id. at 577 n.3.
Id.
Id. at 574.
Id. at 579.
Id.
Id.
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rhetoric in general.311 Regardless, if the Court wanted to use the more
exacting strict scrutiny standard of review, the Court should say so.312
C. Justice Robert Cordy’s Dissent
In his brief dissent, Justice Cordy contributed to the Court’s
fracturing. Cordy pointed out that the Senate bill provided “an
identical bundle of legal rights and benefits” to same-sex and
different-sex couples.313 Only the name of the legal institution
varied.314 Accordingly, the bill might “not even raise a due process or
equal protection claim.”315
Nonetheless, if it were necessary to determine whether different
labels required a law to satisfy the rational basis standard, Cordy
preferred to withhold judgment until the conclusion of the
Legislature’s deliberations. 316 Because of the Goodridge opinion, the
Court likely would have plenty of documentation to review regarding
the Legislature’s purposes for passing Senate No. 2175.317 At that later
time, he felt an appropriate determination could be made.318
V. CONCLUSION
Informed by social movement theory in the field of
communication, this Article has examined the rhetorics of the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Goodridge v. Department of
Public Health, as well as in Opinions of the Justices to the Senate. The
Article has shown how the Supreme Judicial Court fractured in
responding to both the Plaintiffs’ movement activity in support of
same-sex marriage and also to the legislative attempt at control after
the original agitation and the Court’s ensuing Goodridge decision.
Taken together, the opinions of Justices Marshall and Greaney focused
on discrimination against sexual minorities and the Court’s power of
311. See Robert Hariman, Status, Marginality, and Rhetorical Theory, 72 Q.J. SPEECH 38, 39
(1986); GEORGE A. KENNEDY, CLASSICAL RHETORIC AND ITS CHRISTIAN AND SECULAR
TRADITION FROM ANCIENT TO MODERN TIMES 66 (2d ed. 1999). For a general definition of
rhetoric, see ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC: A THEORY OF CIVIC DISCOURSE 36 (George A. Kennedy
trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1991).
312. Ops. of the Justs. to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d at 580 (Sosman, J., dissenting).
313. Id. at 580–81 (Cordy, J., dissenting).
314. Id. at 581.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id. Cordy commented that the holding of Goodridge “rested on [a] slender reed.” Id. at
580.
318. Id. at 581.
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judicial review to vindicate minority rights in constitutional cases. The
justices who constituted the majority bloc on the Court rejected
tradition as a justification for oppression of minority rights. Also, the
justices attempted to humanize the agitating sexual minority Plaintiffs
and employed emotion as well as reason to do so.
In contrast, taken together, the opinions of Justices Spina,
Sosman, and Cordy focused on allowing the Legislature, in theory the
representative of the people, to decide what the dissenting justices
believed to be a public policy matter. The Legislature had, or, upon
further debate, might have had, a rational basis for its action or
potential action. The dissenting justices did not believe the Court
should have decided such a matter. Justice Greaney later called the
dispute about which branch of government should have decided the
case “the seismic fault in state constitutional law decisions.”319
Despite their position, the dissenters did express some empathy for the
Plaintiffs.
Furthermore, the Article has shown how, in a wide-open case
with limited precedent, the majority of the Court, although not the
social movement itself, played a leading role from within the
establishment in furthering the movement for same-sex marriage.
Using the tool of judicial review, the majority acted as an agent of
change on behalf of the social movement. While partially
institutionalized, the social movement for same-sex marriage had not
become fully institutionalized. Indeed, other actors in the state
government such as Governor Romney and portions of the
Legislature, along with most members of the national public and some
very powerful politicians in Washington, DC, including President
Bush, did not support same-sex marriage. Through the Plaintiffs, the
movement for same-sex marriage had gained an important ally in the
Court for an ongoing struggle, and the struggle would continue, in part
because of the strong negative responses from other components of
the establishment.
In so viewing Goodridge and the Opinions of the Justices, the
Article has problematized traditional social movement theory in
communication in several ways. Following less traditional research on
social movements, the Article has provided an example of how

319. John M. Greaney, Breaking Down Barriers: The Goodridge Decision and Modern Civil
Rights, 72 ALB. L. REV. 609, 614 (2009).
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outsiders can have a point of entry into the system when the
establishment, hardly monolithic, fractures in responding to agitation.
Moreover, the Article has taken the additional step of illustrating what
can ensue when outsiders have a point of entry. Indeed, a social
movement can gain allies important enough in number or influence
who can bring about change within the system. The majority of the
Court, by virtue of judicial review, proved to be an influential ally
within the establishment that could allow the movement meaningful
access to the establishment. Neither the social movement itself nor a
reactionary part of the establishment, the majority of the Court
functioned in a liminal rhetorical space. Hence, the once-clear line
between a social movement and the establishment can become, at least
in some circumstances, less of a line and more of a blur.
Although not the beginning of a social movement, Goodridge was
the beginning of same-sex marriage recognized at the state supreme
court level in the United States. In subsequent years, supreme courts
in states like California,320 Connecticut,321 and Iowa322 would legalize
same-sex marriage, and other components of the establishment would
respond negatively. The rhetorical conflict would continue.

320. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008), superseded by constitutional amendment,
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5, abrogated by Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015).
321. Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008).
322. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009).
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